Jurisdictional Clauses in Platform Work Contracts: A Danish Perspective by Lund-Sørensen, Asger
    
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jurisdictional Clauses in Platform Work 
Contracts: A Danish Perspective 
 
Asger Lund-Sørensen* 
                                                        
* PhD-fellow, Department of Law, University of Aarhus, Denmark. 
JURISDICTIONAL CLAUSES IN PLATFORM WORK CONTRACTS 
   
 
262 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 263 
1.1. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY AND WORK ................................. 264 
1.2. THE PLATFORMS ....................................................................... 266 
1.2.1. CLICKWORKER ............................................................... 266 
1.2.2. TAXIFY ............................................................................ 266 
2. JURISDICTION, AGREEMENTS AND PLATFORM WORK .................... 267 
2.1. AGREEING ................................................................................. 267 
2.2. RELEVANCE .............................................................................. 268 
2.3. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS .............................................................. 268 
2.4. APPLICATION ............................................................................ 270 
2.4.1. CLICKWORKER ............................................................... 270 
2.4.2. TAXIFY ............................................................................ 276 
3. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 282 
4. EPILOGUE ............................................................................................ 283 
  
NJCL 2018/1 
 
263 
ABSTRACT 
Recent technological developments have increased the need for a 
restatement of some of the prescriptive concepts in labour law, 
consumer law, completion law, contract law as well as in other areas. 
Many researchers have increased their scrutiny of these concepts, and for 
this special issue of the Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, this article 
tries to deal with what might be an overarching legal issue - the issue of 
where to solve potential disputes. 
This paper is both investigative and exploratory in nature. Using 
doctrinal research method, and two examples, the author examines the 
possible legal approaches to disputes arising from work contracts entered 
into by individuals and platform companies. 
The analysis of two different jurisdictional clauses takes into 
account the character of the subject in the main contract, and finds 
potential difficulties and consequences in applying the current PIL 
regime to the sui generis contracts of the platform economy. 
Following the conclusions, while based on inductive reasoning, it 
could be hypothesized that there is a need for a restatement of some 
concepts in PIL.  
This paper argues, based on two examples, that jurisdictional 
agreements in platform work contracts, and the rules governing them, 
cause uncertainty and unpredictability. Further studies need to be done 
to support this. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most contracts of work involve parties located in the same country, 
wherefore the question of jurisdiction does not need much 
consideration. However, in contracts with an international aspect these 
questions can be of great importance, and jurisdictional agreements can 
create predictability in the legal relationship.  
That the standardized patterns of both the social and economic 
regulation of labour are changing can hardly be contested.1 The 
prevalence of standard employment contracts as the means of engaging 
in remunerated work, is declining around the world.2 In recent years a 
new phenomenon, the platform economy, has introduced a new 
international aspect to the world of work. The digital nature of the 
platform economy opens up the possibility of cross-border work 
contracts different from the ones we know. 
                                                        
1 Alain Supiot (ed), Beyond Employment (OUP 2001) 2. 
2 Katherine V.W. Stone, ‘The Decline in the Standard Employment Contract: Evidence 
from Ten Advanced Industrial Countries’ (2012) SSRN 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2181082> accessed May 29th 2018. 
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1.1. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY AND WORK 
The platform economy has been debated, publicly and 
scientifically, for around a decade. In short, a platform is a digital 
location, where users of different characteristics can obtain information 
and interact, socially or economically.3 The platform economy is a term 
used to encapsulate the economic transactions and business models that 
unfold within the framework of the platforms. 
The platforms of interest in this article are the ones that provide 
access to labour, as opposed to the ones that provide access to capital 
goods.  
There is no consensus on what exactly comprises ‘platform work’. 
Neither in the political/media discourse or in the academic debate is the 
term used systematically.4 This conceptual confusion blurs the debate, 
but for the purpose of this article the concept of platform work is seen 
as a specific manifestation of the broader online platform economy, 
more precisely one involving the provision of labour.5 The labour can be 
of a digital or manual nature but the platform has to be involved in some 
way other than by presenting static information on a website. The 
platform can play a role in either the organisation of the work in the 
production process and/or in the provision of the labour itself.6 This 
article focuses only on platforms where labour is the principal service, 
which clearly distinguishes them from the capital platforms. In this 
article work platforms are exemplified by the cases of Clickworker7 and 
Taxify8 that are both described below. The two examples have been 
chosen because they both include jurisdictional clauses in their terms and 
conditions of use (T&C) and because Clickworker is, and Taxify aims to 
be, available in Denmark. 
For the purpose of this article the term service providers covers the 
individuals performing the labour. The term platform is used to describe 
the company that connects the labourer and the entity that is in need of 
labour – the latter covered by the terms user or customer. 
                                                        
3 Sacha Garben, ‘Protecting Workers in the Online Platform Economy: An overview of 
regulatory and policy developments in the EU’ (European Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work 2017), 9 (Garben: Protecting Workers) 
<https://osha.europa.eu/en/tools-and-publications/publications/regulating-
occupational-safety-and-health-impact-online-platform> accessed May 29th 2018. 
4 Cristiano Codagnone and Bertin Martens, ‘Scoping the Sharing Economy: Origins, 
Definitions, Impact and Regulatory Issues’ (2016) Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies Digital Economy Working Paper 2016/01 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2783662> accessed May 29th 2018. 
5 Garben: Protecting Workers, 11. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Clickworker <www.clickworker.com> accessed May 29th 2018. 
8 Taxify <www.taxify.eu> accessed May 29th 2018. 
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As far as the Nordic research agenda on platform economy is 
concerned, the scholarly angles have been vastly different.9 A common 
denominator in much of the international research and a critical factor in 
any labour law debate is the classification issue concerning the ‘service 
providers’. Are they independent contractors, employees or something 
in-between? As Trebor Schulz writes, ‘the question of misclassification might 
seem overly technical, inessential, or even esoteric … ’, 10 for the uninitiated, but 
as this article will show, the question can have far-reaching implications 
for the parties involved – not just in a labour law context. 
In most Member States, the lack of an employment relationship means 
that labour law is inapplicable.11 The platforms have been accused of 
misclassifying their service providers as independent contractors to avoid 
labour law obligations.12 The response from the platforms has mainly 
referred to the contracts that state that the service providers are not 
employees and that the platforms only provide a technology service.  
To rectify a potential classification issue through litigation, the 
question of jurisdiction must first be answered. When a service provider 
enters into a contract as an independent contractor, he often accepts 
terms that potentially reduce his chances of successful litigation, by 
reducing the number of jurisdictions available to him. The validity of 
such jurisdictional clauses is therefore interesting. 
As this article will show, the question of jurisdiction depends on 
the outcome of a ‘classification debate’ as well. As long as there is doubt 
regarding the classification, there will be doubt as to the validity of the 
jurisdictional clauses, which will be a source of unpredictability instead of 
predictability.  
This article examines what issues Member State judges, in casu a 
Danish judge, must consider, what instruments and principles are 
applicable and how the validity of the clauses will be assessed. 
  
                                                        
9 See for example Marie Jull Sørensen, 'Private Law Perspectives on Platform Services' 
(2016) Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, Volume 5, Issue 1, 15, Jane 
Bolander, ‘Deleøkonomi og Skat’ in Peter Møgelvang-Hansen (ed), Liber Amicorum (Ex 
Tuto 2016), and Marianne Jenum Hotvedt, ‘Arbeidsgiveransvar i 
formidlingsøkonomien? Tilfellet Uber’ (2016), Lov og Rett, Volume 56, Issue 8, 484.  
10 Trebor Scholz, Uberworked and Underpaid (Polity Press 2017) (Scholz 2017), 129. 
11 Garben: Protecting Workers, 15. 
12 The Labour Court in Paris decided that Uber and their service providers were bound 
by no employment contract, in the judgement of January 29th 2018 in the case F 
16/11460 Florian Menard v Uber < www.diritto-lavoro.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/sentenza-del-29-gennaio-2018.pdf> accessed May 31st 2018 
(English translation); The Employment Appeal Tribunal in London reached a different 
conclusion, and considered the service providers to be ‘workers’ in a British context, 
see Uber B.V. and Others v Mr Y Aslam and Others [2017] UKEAT/0056/17/DA. 
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1.2. THE PLATFORMS 
This section presents the two example platforms, which represent 
two of the archetypes of the platform economy, crowdsourced digital 
work and transport services.  
1.2.1. CLICKWORKER 
Clickworker is a German platform that ‘utilizes the knowledge of 
the crowd’.13 The concept, in short, is based on a database of service 
providers (Clickworkers), willing to work, and a line of customers with 
tasks to be solved. Prior to offering any tasks, the platform collects 
information on the service providers’ skills, knowledge and interests.14 
The platform has a full-service solution and a self-service solution, each 
indicating a different level of engagement from them. Both products 
involve breaking down large and complex tasks into microtasks that can 
be solved by an individual. Microtasks may vary from translating longer 
texts to performing one simple search on Google.com and reporting the 
results. After the service provider has completed the task, the platform 
ensures the quality by different means, including statistical process 
control, audits and peer review. If the work performed is ‘inadequate and 
unsatisfactory’ no payment is made.15 The service provider is offered 
tasks at a piecemeal rate and the platform handles the remuneration.  
1.2.2. TAXIFY 
Taxify is an Estonian platform with an international transportation 
network. The concept is based on a smartphone application, an app, 
which allow people to request personal transportation services.16 A user 
in need of the service can enter a request in the app and the platform 
then searches for an idle service provider. The platform then offers the 
task to the assigned service provider and if accepted he is dispatched. 
The service provider picks up the user in his own car and drives to the 
destination after which the payment is made. The service providers are 
considered to be independent contractors.17 The platforms collect 
information on the service providers’ activity level, rate of acceptance 
                                                        
13 Clickworker, ‘About clickworker’ <www.clickworker.com/about-us> accessed May 
29th 2018. 
14 Clickworker, ‘Our crowd – the Clickworkers’ <www.clickworker.com/about-
us/clickworker-crowd> accessed May 29th 2018. 
15 Clickworker, ‘General Terms and Conditions (Clickworkers)’ 
<https://workplace.clickworker.com/en/agreements/10123> (Clickworker T&C), 3.1. 
16 The business model is very similar to that of Uber, which has become notorious 
around the world. For a thorough analysis of the business model, that covers 
everything from philosophy, ethics, economy, business and law, see Henry Schneider, 
Uber: Innovation in Society (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) (Schneider: Uber). 
17 Taxify, ‘General Terms for Drivers’ <https://taxify.eu/da/legal/terms-for-drivers> 
(Taxify T&C), para 10.4 
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and location, which together with the users’ ratings are used for 
suspending underperformers, temporarily or permanently. 
2. JURISDICTION, AGREEMENTS AND PLATFORM WORK 
The issue of jurisdiction is usually the first one to present itself in a 
transnational case.18 The EU Commission estimates that almost 70 % of 
European cross-border contracts on goods and services involve a 
jurisdictional agreement.19 Allowing the parties to choose the jurisdiction 
creates legal certainty and predictability and party autonomy is therefore 
of paramount importance in International Private Law. 20 An exclusive 
agreement can either concern prorogation or derogation, by expressly 
pointing out that proceedings must or must not be brought in a specific 
forum. A non-exclusive agreement points out a specific forum, but does 
not restrict the parties, retaining some flexibility, at the expense of 
predictability. 
If a service provider located in Denmark works via a digital 
platform with its base in Germany, there is a possible conflict of interest. 
Both parties might wish to pursue litigation in a specific forum. Most 
probably, each party will prefer to pursue litigation in his home country, 
as there are usually several obvious advantages over litigating in a foreign 
system. 
2.1. AGREEING 
In the platform economy, the business model is reliant on the 
streamlined infrastructure of a strong and experienced actor for it to be 
able to reach its goals of lower transaction costs and thereby profit.21 
Oftentimes, the platform’s strongest bargaining chip is the access to the 
market, in other words, Taxify’s passengers are only available through 
Taxify’s platform.22 If the platforms holds the key to a market with large 
access costs, this places them on top in the negotiation process. The 
service providers, on the other hand, regardless of their legal status, are 
alone. They presumably do not have a team of legal experts advising 
them, and they might not have the competencies to understand the 
boilerplate language in a standard contract. As many of the service 
                                                        
18 Ketilbjørn Hertz and Joseph Lookofsky, Transnational Litigation and Commercial 
Arbitration (4th edn, DJØF 2017) (Hertz & Lookofsky 2017) 471. 
19 Commission, ‘Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment’, SEC (2010) 1547 final, 29. 
20 Peter Arnt Nielsen, ‘Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements and Parallel Proceedings’ 
in The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, A 
Commitment to Private International Law. Essays in Honour of Hans van Loon (Intersentia 
2013) 409. 
21 Scholz 2017, 43. 
22 Taxify connects two groups of people and thereby creates the market. The first group 
has idle capacity and would like to exchange it on the market, and the other group has a 
demand for the capacity and would like to pay for it, cf. Schneider: Uber, 29ff. 
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providers are oftentimes working through the platforms only to 
supplement their income,23 they are possibly inclined to accept terms 
they otherwise would not, when the contract is offered as one of 
adhesion, in the sense that it is presented on a “take it or leave it” basis. 
This could mean that the ones that rely solely on the platform to make a 
living, are forced to accept the same terms.  
2.2. RELEVANCE 
Whether or not the parties can rely on the jurisdictional agreement 
is in itself important as the purpose is to ensure a high degree of legal 
certainty and predictability. Furthermore, a binding jurisdictional 
agreement can have the effect that a party is prevented from relying on 
mandatory rules that would have been applied, if another court had 
jurisdiction. This is especially relevant in the borderline territory of 
labour law, where most of the rules cannot be derogated from to the 
detriment of an employee. If the status of a service provider is unclear, 
the question arises as to what provisions govern the validity of the 
jurisdictional agreement, and therefore according to which law the 
existence of a relationship is going to be assessed. A service provider 
might be considered an employee in one Member State and an 
independent contractor in another. As will be shown below, the 
jurisdictional regime assumes inequality in the employment relationship, 
wherefore protective measures apply.24	
2.3. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
In assessing jurisdictional agreements, the first step is to decide 
which legal instrument to apply.25  
Denmark’s national rules on territorial jurisdiction are found in part 
22 of The Administration of Justice Act.26 However, following paragraph 
247, the act’s international jurisdictional rules yield for the Brussels I 
Regime. Denmark recently ratified the 2005 Hague Convention on 
                                                        
23 Anna Ilsøe and Louise W. Madsen, ‘FAOS Research Paper 163’ (2018) IRSDACE – 
National Report Denmark, 4.2.1.2. 
<https://faos.ku.dk/publikationer/forskningsnotater/fnotater-2018/Fnotat_163_-
_Industrial_Relations_and_Social_Dialogue_in_the_Age_of_Collaborative_economy_
_IRSDACE_.pdf> accessed May 29th 2018. 
24 Hertz & Lookofsky 2017, 110. 
25 Alameda C., Alfonso et al., ‘Choice-of-court agreements under Brussels I Recast 
Regulation’, Escuela Judicial (Spain), 3. 
<www.ejtn.eu/Documents/Themis%20Luxembourg/Written_paper_Spain1.pdf> 
accessed May 29th 2018. 
26 LBKG nr. 1101 af den 22. september 2017, Retsplejeloven [The Administration of 
Justice Act]. 
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Choice of Court Agreements.27 Jurisdictional agreements relating to 
contracts of employment are expressly excluded from the scope of the 
Convention.28 The Convention does not, however, change the state of 
the law relating to intra-EU cases, wherefore it will not be discussed 
further in this article.   
The Brussels I Regulation governs issues of jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters. 29 Denmark is opting out from the Community cooperation in a 
number of areas, including the field of justice, wherefore the Regulation 
as such does not apply. However, due to a bilateral agreement between 
EU and Denmark, the rules of the Regulation apply regardless. This 
distinction will not be examined further, and the Regulation will be 
applied in a Danish context as is. 
The general principle of Brussels I is that jurisdiction is dependent 
on the domicile of the defendant. 30 Article 4 states that a defendant, 
whatever his nationality, can be sued in the courts of the Member State 
in which he has his domicile. The objective of the domicile jurisdiction, 
and of the Regulation, is inter alia, to: “ … ensure legal certainty and avoid the 
possibility of the defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he could 
not reasonably have foreseen.”31 If the dispute regards certain matters, 
including insurance, consumers or employment, it is for the plaintiff to 
choose either the general or a special jurisdiction.32  
Article 25 governs jurisdictional agreements and has two purposes: 
giving the parties freedom to choose and limiting that power, 
reasonably.33 To make sure that the jurisdictional agreements strike the 
right balance, certain conditions of validity are put in place,34 and it is a 
prerequisite for the validity of a jurisdictional agreement that it satisfies 
all formal and material conditions in article 25.35  
                                                        
27 LOV nr. 670 af den 8. juni 2017, Lov om ændring af retsplejeloven, lov om Bruxelles 
I-forordningen m.v. og forskellige andre love [Act amending the Administration of 
Justice Act and various other laws]. 
28 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, June 30th 2005, art 2(1)(b). 
29 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 
[2012] OJ L351/1 (Brussels I). 
30 Brussels I, art 4. 
31 Brussels I, recital 16. 
32 Peter Mankowski, ’Article 7’ in Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds), Brussels 
Ibis Regulation: Volume I (Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 2016) (M&M: Brussels Ibis), note 1. 
33 Ulrich Magnus, ’Article 25’ in M&M: Brussels Ibis, note 1. 
34 Case 25/76 Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Société Rahim Bonakdarian (1976) ECR 1851, para 
6. 
35 Magnus (n 34), note 75. 
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2.4. APPLICATION 
This section presupposes a dispute between a service provider 
located in Denmark and the two platforms, Clickworker36 and Taxify.37 
The service provider is presumed to institute proceedings in Denmark. 
2.4.1. CLICKWORKER 
Clickworker uses the following clause in its standard terms: 
“Insofar as this is legally permissible, Essen shall be the 
exclusive venue for any legal disputes arising out of the 
business relationship between Clickworkers and 
clickworker”38 
From the wording of the clause, it is safe to presume that the 
intention is to confer exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of Essen, 
Germany.  
For the Danish court to assess the jurisdictional clause, it first has 
to decide whether the dispute falls within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation. Article 1(1) of the Regulation states that it applies in civil and 
commercial matters. The definition of such matters is not given in the 
Regulation itself, but it is generally accepted in both the literature and 
case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), that all litigation 
between private parties fall within the scope of the Regulation, except 
when the case is excluded by subject matter.39 Employment law is 
specifically included as there are special provisions on the matter in 
section 5. 
Next, the court has to assess whether the courts of a Member State 
have exclusive jurisdiction following article 24 of the Regulation. 
Exclusive jurisdiction bypasses all other general and special rules of 
jurisdiction and cannot be derogated from by agreement.40 The case at 
hand is not subject to exclusive jurisdiction. 
                                                        
36 Not only is Clickworker accessible from Denmark, they have actively sought out 
workers here as well by placing job ads online, cf. Jobindex, ‘Internet 
Research/Dataindsamling’ 
<www.jobindexarkiv.dk/cgi/showarchive.cgi?tid=h683856> and Jobindex, 
‘Tekstforfattere og korrekturlæsere’ <www.jobindex.dk/vis-job/h669070> both 
accessed May 30th 2018. 
37 Taxify is not currently active on the Danish market but they are present in several 
European countries, e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic 
countries. Taxify has stated that they are looking to enter the Danish market following 
Uber’s goodbye, cf. The Copenhagen Post, ‘Taxify eyeing Denmark following Uber’s 
demise’ (March 31st 2017) <http://cphpost.dk/news/business/taxify-eyeing-denmark-
following-ubers-demise.html> accessed May 30th 2018.  
38 Clickworker T&C, para 8.3.  
39 Pippa Rogerson, ‘Article 1’ in M&M: Brussels Ibis, note 16. 
40 Luís de Lima Pinheiro, ‘Article 24’ in M&M: Brussels Ibis, note 3, cf. Brussels I, art 
25(4). 
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The next matter at hand is to examine whether the claimant falls 
within one of the protected categories in Brussels I. These protected 
categories are comprised of what is seen as weaker parties in the need of 
protection from standard clauses in contracts.41 The protection consists 
of provisions placing the ‘weaker party’ in an intermediate position 
between the exclusive nature of article 24 and the ‘total’ freedom of 
article 25.42 
In relation to platform work and international contracts on the 
provision of labour the relevant ‘weaker party protection regime’ to 
consider is the one found in section 5 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
namely the one concerning individual contracts of employment. That the 
contract classifies the relationship as a ‘business relationship’43 carries in 
itself no decisive meaning. 
Section 5 governs jurisdiction in matters relating to individual 
contracts of employment according to article 20(1) of the Brussels I. As 
with the general scope, the Regulation does not include a definition of 
the concept of an ‘individual contract of employment’. As such a 
concept has different meaning in different Member States, the ECJ has 
intervened and developed an autonomous interpretation of the 
concept.44 The concept has been developed in both case law and in the 
Jenard/Möller report45 accompanying one of the Brussels I predecessors, 
the Lugano Convention.46 According to the ECJ in the case of Shenavai v 
Kreischer, a contract of employment is characterized by a durable relation 
between individual and company, a lasting bond, which brings the 
worker, to some extent, within the organizational framework of the 
business.47 The contract also has to be linked to the place of 
performance, which determines what mandatory rules and collective 
agreements are to be applied.48 It has however been suggested that the 
precedent value of the ruling, in a Brussels I context, is suboptimal due 
to the fact that employment contracts were not separately regulated at 
the time.49 
Furthermore, the Jenard/Möller Report introduced the concept of 
subordination to the equation, following which an employment contract 
                                                        
41 Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law (2nd edn Hart Publishing 2016) 
(Van Calster: EPIL), 89. 
42 Van Calster: EPIL, 106. 
43 Clickworker T&C, para 3.4. 
44 Van Calster: EPIL, 109. 
45 Paul Jenard and Gustav Möller, ‘Report accompanying the Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at 
Lugano on 16 September 1988’ (Jenard/Möller Report), OJ [1990] C189/57. 
46 Convention 88/592/EEC on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters [1988] OJ L 319. 
47 Case 266/85 Hassan Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer [1987] ECR 239, para 16. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Van Calster: EPIL, 110. 
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presupposes a relationship of subordination of the employee to the 
employer.50 In the case of Holterman v Spies51, AG Cruz Villalòn specified 
that the purpose of the assessment is to distinguish the employment 
contracts from other contracts involving the provision of services.52 To 
do this, the ECJ looks towards the concept of a worker in the context of 
article 45 TFEU and other legislative acts, since it has been developed 
more and continues to be.53 In such a context, the essential feature of an 
employment relationship is that a person, for a certain period of time, 
performs services for and under the direction of another, in return for 
which remuneration is paid.54 
The test that the Court applies is used both to establish the concept 
of a worker and to distinguish workers from independent contractors. In 
the case of Ruhrlandklinik, the Court asserted that restricting the concept 
of a worker to those that have a tangible employment contract was liable 
to undermine the effectiveness of the underlying directive in an 
inordinate and unjustified way.55 The term worker must be given a broad 
interpretation, and any exceptions to and derogations from, on the other 
hand, must be interpreted strictly.56 
When distinguishing workers from independent contractors, the 
ECJ does not shy away from reclassifying the relationship, if the 
independence is merely notional.57 But where do they draw the line? The 
ECJ delimits negatively by stating that:  
“Since the essential characteristic of an employment 
relationship . . . is the fact that for a certain period of time a 
person performs services for and under the direction of 
another person in return for which he receives remuneration, 
any activity which a person performs outside a relationship of 
subordination must be classified as an activity pursued in a 
self-employed capacity . . . ”58 
                                                        
50 Jenard/Möller Report, point 41. 
51 Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV and Others v F.L.F. Spies von Büllesheim 
[2015]. 
52 Ibid, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalòn, para 27. 
53 Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV and Others v F.L.F. Spies von Büllesheim 
[2015], para 41. 
54 Case 66/85 Deborah Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121, paras 16 
and 17; for the context of the Council Directive (EC) 92/85, see the judgment in Case 
C-232/09 Dita Danosa v LKB Līzings SIA [2010], para 39. 
55 Case C-216/15 Betriebsrat der Ruhrlandklinik gGmbH v. Ruhrlandklinik gGmbH [2016], 
para 36. 
56 Case 139/85 R. H. Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1986), ECR 1741, para 13. 
57 Case C-256/01 Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College [2004] ECR 873, para 
71. 
58 Case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] 
ECR 8615, para 34. 
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Even though the ECJ has developed the concept, it is for the 
national courts, in casu the Danish court, to apply the criteria in 
practice.59  
As to the durability criteria, the relationship between the service 
provider and the platform, in the case of Clickworker, can hardly be 
characterized as a lasting bond per se. The service providers are entitled 
to delete their accounts at any time on their own initiative,60 and some 
might do so after performing a limited amount of work. Some might 
however depend on the income from the platform as an important or 
necessary component of their budget, as suggested by a qualitative 
survey.61 It can be helpful to draw upon the case law of the ECJ in the 
context of the free movements, as it treats a similar issue, namely when a 
work activity can be viewed as so marginal and ancillary that it excludes 
the performer from the concept of worker and thus from the protection 
of the Treaty. In the case of Fenoll did the fact that the worker was paid 
substantially less than a guaranteed national average not mean that he 
was excluded from worker classification and the accompanying 
protection.62 Some do not pursue activities on the Clickworker-platform 
as anything else than a distraction, but the 41% that depend on the 
platform assumedly maintain a stronger bond with the platform, which 
could be considered as bringing them within the scope of the 
employment relationship in a Brussels I context. 
That the platform denotes the service providers as ‘our 
Clickworkers’ could be seen as an indication that they are, to some 
extent, brought within the organizational framework of the platform. 
The users are considered the customers of the platform and not of the 
service providers.  
As to the link to a place of performance criteria, the T&C stipulates 
that the platform itself, in concreto its websites, are to be considered ‘the 
workplace’. 63 This author argues that the notion of ‘place’ in relation to 
the ‘workplace’ and the ‘place of performance’ is becoming increasingly 
                                                        
59 Van Calster: EPIL, 110, cf. Case C-337/97 C.P.M. Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de 
Informatie Beheer Groep [1999], ECR 3289, para 16. 
60 Clickworker T&C, para 2.7. 
61 The survey, which suggests that 41 % of Clickworker’s service providers are 
dependent on the income, was made by the German organisation Fair Crowd Work, 
that collects information about platform work from the perspective of workers and 
unions, cf. Fair Crowd Work, ‘Clickworker’ 
<http://faircrowd.work/platform/clickworker> accessed May 30th 2018.  
62 Case C-316/13 Gérard Fenoll v. Centre d’aide par le travail [2015], para 33. 
63 Clickworker T&C, para 1.1. 
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obsolete.64 In the Holterman v Spies ruling, the ECJ abstained from 
emphasizing exactly this part of the Shenavai v Kreischer test.65 
The subordination criteria must be assessed on the basis of all of 
the factors and circumstances characterising the relationship between the 
parties.66 In the Clickworker T&C, ‘projects’ are presented as invitations 
to submit an offer, an ‘invitatio ad offerendum’.67 Technically, this means 
that the platforms’ posting of a job to the list does not constitute a 
binding offer. However, in practice are service providers only ‘offered’ 
jobs that correspond to their ‘qualification profile’ and the work itself 
can begin immediately after clicking on it.68  
After the customer has made a request to Clickworker, the 
platform creates tasks that can be performed by individual service 
providers. The conditions of a specific project are set by the customer 
and/or the platform, and the remuneration is non-negotiable. The 
prerequisite qualifications for service providers to accept a specific task 
and the criteria for subsequent acceptance of the performance are also 
set by the platform. If either a temporal or material condition is not met, 
the service provider will receive no compensation. When the service 
providers’ performance is ‘inadequate or unsatisfactory’, he will, if the 
customers’ deadline allows it, have three days to revise or rectify the 
defective work product. The platform expressly states that the service 
provider is prohibited from ‘subcontracting or outsourcing’ projects.69 If 
the service provider violates either the T&C or any other obligation 
arising from the contractual relationship, the platform reserves the rights 
to delete the user account.70 The data needed to make such a decision are 
collected seamlessly whenever the service provider accesses any part of 
the Clickworker website.71 In this way, the platform can both supervise 
the performance of work and subsequently discipline poor performance. 
As the ECJ in the Holterman v Spies ruling, for the first time, directly 
considered the meaning of ‘individual contract of employment’, in the 
context of Brussels I, it is worth noting that AG Cruz Villalón sees ‘the 
power of management and instructions’ as the defining factor of a subordinate 
                                                        
64 Miriam A. Cherry, ‘A Taxonomy of Virtual Work' Georgia Law Review (2011) 951–
1013, II, D. 
65 Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV and Others v F.L.F. Spies von Büllesheim 
[2015], para 45. 
66 Ibid, para 46. 
67 Clickworker T&C, para 3.1. 
68 This author created a profile on Clickworker, accepted a task and performed the 
service, without further offer/acceptance formalities. 
69 Clickworker T&C, para 3.3. 
70 Clickworker T&C, para 2.7. 
71 Clickworker, ‘Terms of Data Privacy’, paras 1 and 3, 
<https://workplace.clickworker.com/en/agreements/10124> accessed May 30th 2018. 
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relationship.72 This, and the fact that the ECJ referenced the case law 
regarding article 45 TFEU, suggests that a wide definition of 
employment should be applied.73  
There is an imbalance between the platform and the service 
provider. The platform has the power of management, e.g. when they 
assign a task to a specific service provider and subsequently monitor the 
performance, under the threat that non-compliance can lead to 
exclusion. Even though the overall description of the project comes 
from the customer, it is the platform who divides it into smaller tasks 
and instructs the service providers in the performance of them. These 
factors point towards an employment relationship. That the service 
provider can choose when to work and what tasks to do does however 
point in the opposite direction. On the other hand, the notion of 
flexibility does not negate an employment relationship per se, since all 
factors and circumstances in each case has to be assessed. As shown 
above, numerous conditions are imposed on the service providers and 
control is exerted both during and after the performance. 
Section 5 in Brussels I is essentially a protection of the weaker 
party, the employee. To assess the relationship, one must first accede to 
the wide definitions of the ECJ and take into account that the Danish 
courts traditionally take a dynamic and teleological approach to the 
defining concepts of labour law.74  
For all of the above mentioned reasons, provided that the specific 
dispute involves a service provider that depends on the income from the 
platform and moreover that the facts of the relationship perfectly align, it 
is not completely unwarranted to expect a Danish court to consider the 
service provider and the platform to be in an employment relationship, 
and therefore section 5 of the Regulation to be applicable. The service 
provider, for a certain period of time, performs a service for and under 
the direction of the platform in return for remuneration. 
The question of whether the jurisdictional agreement is valid in this 
specific example therefore has to be answered in the context of section 
5, including article 23, which states that the protective provisions may 
only be departed from by agreement if said agreement is concluded after 
the dispute has arisen, or if the agreement gives the employee access to 
                                                        
72 Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitatie BV and Others v F.L.F. Spies von Büllesheim 
[2015], Opinion of AG Cruz Villalòn, para 28. 
73 Louise Merrett, ‘The Contract of Employment in its International and European Law 
Setting’ in Mark Freedland (ed) The Contract of Employment (OUP 2016), 632ff. 
74 Ole Hasselbalch, Den Danske Arbejdsret I-III (Schultz Arbejdsretsportal, online), 
Section III, 1.1, cf the ruling of June 24th 1986 Sø- og Handelsretten [the Maritime and 
Commercial Court of Copenhagen] in the case F-79/85, where a finishing artist at an 
ad agency, hired on a piecemeal basis, was considered to be an employee in the context 
of the legislation on sickness benefit but not in the context of the legislation on sick 
pay. 
JURISDICTIONAL CLAUSES IN PLATFORM WORK CONTRACTS 
   
 
276 
other jurisdictions than those indicated in the section itself.75 As the 
agreement obviously was entered into before the dispute arose, it is 
necessary to examine what jurisdiction(s) section 5 appoints.  
The Brussels I Regulation distinguishes between disputes where the 
employee is the plaintiff and those where the employer is the plaintiff. 
As the case at hand, and the majority of labour law suits,76 is initiated by 
the ‘employee’, the relevant provision is article 21. 
The general rule of jurisdiction in the defendant’s domicile is found 
in article 21(1)(a) as well. Employers may however also be sued in the 
courts for the place where or from where the employee habitually carries 
out his work, according to article 21(1)(b)(i). This is the main factor of 
the protective design of section 5, as it allows the weaker party, the 
employee, to commence, or defend himself against, court proceedings in 
the place ‘where it is least expensive’.77 
The habitual workplace is, according to the ECJ, to be understood as 
the place that is the effective centre of the working activities and where 
the essential parts of the duties vis-à-vis the employer are performed.78 
There are no provisions in the contract between the platform and the 
service provider as to where, geographically, the work has to be 
performed, but only that it has to be performed in the area they call the 
‘Workplace’.79 For the purpose of this analysis, the assumption is that the 
work is performed in Denmark, wherefore the habitual workplace leads 
to Danish jurisdiction, according to article 21(1)(b)(i) of the Brussels I 
Regulation. 
The words of the jurisdictional agreement ‘Essen shall be the 
exclusive venue‘ implies the prorogated exclusive jurisdiction of the 
court, which means that the effect of the clause would be that the service 
provider is barred from suing in Denmark. The jurisdictional agreement 
conflicts with article 23(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, in this specific 
example, thus voiding it, according to article 25(4). 
2.4.2. TAXIFY 
Taxify’s standard terms contain the following dispute settlement clause: 
“Any dispute that may arise in connection with this 
Agreement, whether with respect to its existence, validity, 
interpretation, performance, breach, termination or otherwise, 
shall be settled by way of negotiations. If the respective 
dispute resulting from this Agreement could not be settled by 
the negotiations, then the dispute will be finally solved in 
                                                        
75 Brussels I, arts 23(1) and (2). 
76 Carlos Esplugues Mota, ‘Article 21’ in M&M: Brussels Ibis, note 1. 
77 Case C-125/92 Mulox IBC Ltd v Hendrick Geels [1993], ECR I-4075, para 19, cf. Mota 
(n 768), note 13. 
78 Case C-383/95 Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd [1997], ECR I-57, para 23. 
79 Clickworker T&C, para 1.1. 
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Harju County Court Kentmanni court house in Tallinn, 
Republic of Estonia.“80 
As can be seen from the quote, the Taxify T&C require initial 
‘negotiation’ as a dispute settlement mechanism. However, for the 
purpose of this article, this negotiation-clause is treated as legally non-
binding on the basis of uncertainty.81 The Danish courts have not 
determined specific criteria regarding the enforceability of such clauses, 
but seem to allow the parties to initiate litigation regardless of even well-
defined mediation clauses.82 The Taxify T&C negotiation-clause is 
however not well-defined. Even though mandatory language as the word 
‘shall’ is used, the clause contains neither deadlines nor specification of 
the negotiation participants, which is essential for the enforcement of 
multi-tier resolution clauses.83  
For the remaining part of this article, it is presumed that the 
intention of the clause is to confer exclusive jurisdiction to the Harju 
County Court in Talinn, Estonia. This court is located in the same 
county as the registered offices of the platform, Taxify. 
The article takes the view that the dispute falls within the scope of 
Brussels I, according to article 1, and that no court has exclusive 
jurisdiction, according to article 24. 
Next is the matter of whether the claim relates to an individual 
employment contract. The fact that the parties have expressly agreed that 
the relationship is not an employment relationship,84 carries in itself no 
decisive meaning. 
The same criteria as used for the analysis of the Clickworker-
relationship has to be applied, in order to determine the nature of the 
relationship in the context of Brussels I. 
Whether or not the relation between the platform and the service 
provider is durable and brings the worker within the organizational 
framework of the business may vary greatly. The Taxify T&C allow both 
individuals and ‘fleet companies’ to register. Individuals may only 
perform transportation services themselves, whereas fleet companies 
may simply use the platform’s software as a dispatching system.85 For the 
purpose of this article only the individual agreements are considered. 
                                                        
80 Taxify T&C, para 15.2. 
81 Neil Andrews, Arbitration and Contract Law (Springer 2016), 36. 
82 See for example the ruling of January 20th 2015 Sø- og Handelsretten [the Maritime 
and Commercial Court of Copenhagen] in the case H-41-10. 
83 Dan Terkildsen, “Denmark” in Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses (International 
BarAssociation 2015), 60 
<https://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Litigation/multitiereddis
puteresolution.aspx> last accessed July 25th 2018. 
84 Taxify T&C, para 10.4. 
85 Taxify T&C, paras 2.5 and 2.6. 
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The agreement allows the service provider to receive requests from 
users interested in transportation services, which the service provider 
may ‘accept or ignore at [his or her] choosing’.86 The service provider is free 
to, at any point, delete the account.87 While providing transportation 
services, the service provider is obliged to have all the necessary licenses, 
certifications and registrations, and the platform has a right to control 
these. The service provider is also obliged to perform the services in ‘a 
professional manner’ in accordance with the business ethics ‘applicable 
to providing such services’, including, but not limited to, taking the route 
least costly for the user and not having other passengers in the car.88 The 
compliance with these ethics is enforced through a rating system, which 
allows the users to rate and give feedback upon completion of services. 
The ratings are published and linked to the service provider’s account, 
just as an ‘activity score’, based on the habits of the service provider, is 
calculated. Both parameters have to exceed a minimum level, set by the 
platform.89 If a service provider, after being notified by Taxify, does not 
increase the parameter levels within a prescribed period of time, his or 
her account will be deactivated automatically, temporarily or 
permanently, at the discretion of the platform.90 The platform is 
generally entitled to terminate the agreement, at its own discretion.91  
The characteristics of the individuals that use the Taxify platform 
may vary as much as in the case of Clickworker. The characteristics of 
the services performed on the Clickworker platform vary greatly within a 
certain genre, whereas the Taxify services are specifically limited to 
transportation. In this case, where the service provider is not affiliated 
with a taxi company or other dispatchers, the threshold for being 
brought within the framework of the platform’s organisation is juxtapose 
to the threshold for more traditional taxi drivers. As the service provider 
is legally bound to the ethics and standards of the platform and 
furthermore given labels and tags to affix to the car, a court may very 
well consider that a service provider performing services for Taxify is 
brought within the organizational framework of the platform. However, 
this criteria, as well as the ‘place of performance’ criteria, are not 
sufficient to point to an employment relationship, also due to their ‘built-
in obsolescence’.92 
Assessing the subordination criteria involves examining whether 
the service provider performs his services under the direction of another, 
in return for remuneration. When a user sends a request for 
transportation services to the platform, the platform presents the service 
                                                        
86 Taxify T&C, para 4.5. 
87 Taxify T&C, para 11.2. 
88 Taxify T&C, para 4.4. 
89 Taxify T&C, paras 8.1 and 8.2. 
90 Taxyfi T&C, para 8.3. 
91 Taxify T&C, para 13.4. 
92 Text to n 66. 
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provider with the possibility to accept or decline. Technically, the choice 
is the service provider’s, though declining is equal with a lowered activity 
score, which is equal to the risk of being deactivated.93 The service 
provider is entitled to charge a fare for each service provided, and a fare 
is automatically calculated and suggested after the trip.94 The service 
provider may lower the fare, but in reality this seems unlikely, as the 
‘Taxify Fee’ that the service provider has to pay, is based on the 
suggested price. The service provider may only charge a higher fee, if he 
is a licensed taxi driver and in that capacity legally obliged to use a 
physical taximeter. The platform can ‘adjust’ the fare after the trip, for 
example if the user believes the service provider took a longer route than 
necessary.95 To assess a claim from a user, the platform may use any of 
the personal data it has collected, including the location based 
information that is transmitted constantly via the smartphone application 
while active.96 To sum up: Taxify controls key information, the contact 
details and location of the user, it determines the ‘right’ route and the 
‘right’ price and it reserves the power to unilaterally change the T&C 
and/or terminate the relationship. Taxify solicits feedback, sets the 
relevant performance levels, and makes decisions based on the users’ 
feedback – just as employers do.97 
Does that mean it is an employment relationship? The threat of 
termination in case of misbehaviour does not in itself help distinguish 
the relationship from other commercial transactions.98 What self-
employed carpenter or gardener is impervious to ratings on Google, 
Facebook or Trustpilot? The service providers do have a relatively high 
degree of freedom, as they for example decide when, where and if at all 
to work. They might be sanctioned if they are active on the platform and 
do not accept tasks, but they are not sanctioned if they do not activate 
the platform to begin with. The service provider accepts the risk of 
losses. If the user does not pay, or the transaction is cancelled due to the 
service providers’ non-compliance with the T&C, the losses fall on the 
service provider, not the platform. The platform does not receive 
payment either, but nor did it invest capital or labour in the specific 
transaction, at least to a significant degree. The service provider is 
obliged to, at his own expense, provide and maintain all equipment and 
the means necessary to perform the services.99 The question is, how 
                                                        
93 Taxify T&C, para 13.6. 
94 Taxify T&C, para 4.7. 
95 Taxify T&C, para 4.8. 
96 Taxify T&C, 11.1. 
97 Benjamin Sachs, ‘Uber and Lyft: Customer Reviews and the Right-to-Control’ 
(Onlabor, May 20th 2015) <https://onlabor.org/uber-and-lyft-customer-reviews-and-
the-right-to-control> accessed May 30th 2018. 
98 Guy Davidov, ‘The Status of Uber Drivers: A Purposive Approach’, Spanish Labour 
Law and Employment Relations Journal, 1-2, Vol. 6, November 2017, 12. 
99 Taxify TOC, para 4.6. 
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these freedoms and responsibilities measure against the factors that point 
towards a subordinate relationship. 
Employment relationships are characterized as suffering from a 
‘democratic deficit’.100 This imbalance is what labour law regulation, in 
this case the weaker party protection provisions in Brussels I, seek to 
even out. One thing that particularly distinguishes the Taxify-platform 
from the Clickworker-platform is that to provide services through Taxify 
one must acquire operational capital of significant value, i.e. a car 
compared to a personal computer. Comparing the size of the parties’ 
investment in the agreement might put some perspective on the 
imbalance and help decide whether the dispute at hand arises from an 
employment relationship. Considering the size of the investment, which 
on the platforms’ side is the same no matter what, the service provider, 
who uses a bought and paid for family car to supplement her income, 
will not necessarily fall into the same category as the young 
entrepreneurial spirit, who takes out a loan to buy a car, and if applicable 
a permit, with the intention of performing transportation services as his 
main profession. The latter might, at some point, want to buy additional 
cars, hire drivers herself and use Taxify as a dispatcher, or maybe she 
maximises her profits by working via different transportation platforms 
simultaneously and thereby advertises her services on several different 
markets.  
As the service providers may vary greatly, and the formalities of the 
contract alone will take us only so far, it is hard to reach a conclusive 
analysis without limiting it to an actual case with actual facts.101 To 
explore the differences in the legal regimes applicable to jurisdictional 
agreements concerning platform workers, regardless of their 
employment status, this article hereinafter considers the possibility that 
the plaintiff is an independent contractor, in the context of the Brussels I 
Regulation, thus not encompassed by section 5. 
The jurisdictional agreements validity therefore has to be assessed 
under article 25 of the Regulation, including the requirements on form, 
certainty and fairness.102 Article 25 regulates international jurisdiction 
                                                        
100 Davidov (n 101), 14. 
101 The ECJ has yet to rule in a dispute concerning the employment status of ‘a 
platform worker’, but in the recent ruling in Case C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite 
Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL [2017], paras 37-40, the Court notes that the platform, in 
casu Uber, is more than an intermediation service, namely a part of a transportation 
service, over which they exercise decisive influence. The Court gives no answers, but 
their assessment of the factors, such as Uber setting the price, handling the payment 
and controlling aspects of the quality regarding both the vehicle and the conduct of the 
service provider, resembles the assessment one would have to do in the context of an 
employment relationship. 
102 Mukarrum Ahmed, The Nature and Enforcement of Choice of Court Agreements (Hart 
Publishing 2017), 4, III, A. 
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agreements conclusively, within the scope of the Regulation.103 However, 
as it has already been established that the agreement does not contradict 
articles 23 and 24 this issue will not be further examined. The material, 
territorial, temporal and personal scope of article 25 will not be discussed 
either. 
The certainty requirement, following the wording ‘disputes which have 
arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship’, serves to 
avoid doubts and disputes over the competent court and to prevent a 
party from forcing a weaker party to litigate in foreign jurisdictions.104 As 
such, this rules out catch all-clauses which cover all present and future 
disputes between two parties.105 The agreement between the platform 
and the service provider pertain to ‘the respective dispute resulting from 
this Agreement’, whereas it clearly limits itself to one legal relationship. 
Article 25 furthermore requires that the specific dispute is connected to 
the relationship for which the jurisdictional agreement is concluded. This 
requirement is met already due to the fact that the dispute arises from 
the same contract which contains the jurisdictional agreement.106 Lastly, 
the certainty requirement demands that the prorogated court is 
designated with sufficient certainty. In the case at hand, the agreement 
clearly designates Harju County Court in Tallinn, whereby the 
requirement is met. 
Another central criteria when applying article 25 is that the parties 
have agreed that their disputes are to be litigated in a certain place.107 The 
ECJ has affirmed the importance of this criteria several times, e.g. in the 
case of Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Société Rahim Bonakdarian (25/76).108  
The agreement in this context is an autonomous concept in EU-law 
and it must be appraised only in relation to the requirements in the 
article itself.109 If the agreement lacks true consensus, the jurisdictional 
agreement is invalid and has no effect.110 The criteria are: (a) the 
agreement must be in writing or evidenced in writing or (b) the form of 
the agreement must comply with either the practices of the parties or in 
international relationships with a usage which the parties are or ought to 
have been aware of.111  
In assessing the ‘in writing’-criteria112 the salient point is whether 
both parties have expressed their consent in written form.113 The criteria 
                                                        
103 Magnus (n 33), note 15. 
104 Ibid, note 65. 
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110 Magnus (n 33), note 77. 
111 Brussels I, art. 25 (1). 
112 Brussels I, art. 25 (1) (a), 1st alt. 
113 Magnus (n 33), note 95. 
JURISDICTIONAL CLAUSES IN PLATFORM WORK CONTRACTS 
   
 
282 
can be met by means of electronic communication, as stated in (2) of the 
article. That the Taxify jurisdictional agreement is contained in the 
general terms and conditions is therefore, in itself, without significance 
for the validity of the clause. When a potential service provider creates 
an account, he accepts the platforms’ Terms of Service and Privacy 
Policy, and is provided with a link to both.114 The ECJ has established a 
set of conditions validating jurisdictional clauses in standard contract 
terms, for the purpose that a jurisdictional clause should not ‘slip a 
reasonable party’s attention’.115 What the conditions, in general terms, 
prevent are hidden clauses that are printed on the back of the contract or 
on separate papers.116 Where a party specifically signed that he had ‘read 
and accepted’ the T&C, the formal requirements of the criteria were held to 
have been complied with.117 This leads to the conclusion that the Taxify 
jurisdictional agreement, prima facie, complies with the requirements of 
article 25.  
Even though the agreement is an autonomous concept in this 
context, there are situations where national law must be considered, even 
in the case of an otherwise valid agreement. 118 These situations, 
including the issues that may rise as a result of Estonian contract law, 
choice of law provisions and possible reverse lis pendens effects, fall 
outside the scope of this article. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The Clickworker T&C contain, at least for this purpose, an invalid 
jurisdictional agreement. If Danish courts, contrary to the agreement, 
categorize the contract as an employment relationship, the jurisdictional 
agreement is void and unenforceable, according to article 25(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation in that it is contrary to article 23. The Danish 
courts may therefore continue proceedings.  
The Taxify T&C contain, at least for this purpose, a valid 
jurisdictional agreement. A Danish court must therefore, of its own 
motion, reject the proceedings as inadmissible, according to article 25(1) 
of the Brussels I Regulation.  
                                                        
114 This method is called click-wrapping. Websites often refer to terms and conditions 
that are located behind ‘a click’ on a link to a subpage. In effect, this means that there is 
no guarantee that the signee has in fact seen the T&C he agrees to. However, the ECJ 
accepts this practice in commercial relationships, as long as the method allows for the 
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4. EPILOGUE 
This last section is part impact analysis and part perspectival 
reflections. 
The individuals’ motivation for entering into contracts online, 
crossing virtual borders, have traditionally been found within the 
consumers’ sphere. The possibility of concluding contracts of work on 
an online platform gives both companies and individuals new 
possibilities. When contracts are entered into, the parties’ bargaining 
powers are hardly ever equal. However, through negotiations 
compromises are made, and different terms and conditions benefit 
different parties. An unfavourable jurisdictional clause can be mitigated 
by a favourable price, or maybe even a favourable choice of law. 
Contractual freedom is the reason that Brussels I focuses on the 
agreement or consensus and only limits it reasonably, as mentioned 
above (section 2.3). The validity criteria for jurisdictional agreements 
emphasize an informed consent. These criteria are put in place to 
distinguish voluntary and coerced agreements.  
The weaker party protection rules are also put in place to assure 
reasonableness, as there are categories of people whom we assume to be 
weak and thus in need of protection. Companies actively target service 
providers in other countries, as mentioned above, by posting job ads on 
Danish websites or announcing their arrival in mass media outlets. The 
risks of not protecting the weaker party is, that they are being taken 
advantage of by stronger parties, whom after having ‘coerced’ a 
jurisdictional agreement into the contract can rest surely knowing that 
the weaker party de facto has no access to justice. Milana Karayanidi 
describes it as letting “[t]he will of one part . . . entirely dominate the transaction 
to the point that it crushes the autonomy of the other party.”119 
Are these service providers necessarily the weaker party? The 
service providers’ themselves have sought out an international business 
partner, when they could have picked a local. They actively chose to sign 
up with a multinational enterprise, maybe because they have more 
clients, customers or users, thus increasing the potential amount of work 
for the service providers. The prospect of forcing platform companies to 
litigate in forums all over the world might however make them seem 
weak. Some have even predicted their ‘death by litigation’, without them 
having to worry about jurisdiction.120 Take Clickworker, who has over 1 
million service providers. According to themselves, 35% of them are 
from the United States, 15% from Germany, 25% from the rest of the 
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EU, and the rest are from all over the world, including Canada, Australia 
and South America.121 Litigating in exotic jurisdictions will likely entail 
expenses, which will be passed on to the users and remaining service 
providers, and legal obstacles can ultimately push the platforms out of 
the market and force them to leave the country. 
Who benefits from the end of the platforms? The 41% that depend 
on the income,122 and probably the most likely to dispute their 
employment status, would lose an important source of income. In a 
platform economy context, the European regime governing jurisdictional 
agreements seem to provide not legal certainty and predictability but 
uncertainty and unpredictability. 
This author therefore subscribes to the view that the European 
private international law is characterized by a lack of coherence and 
conceptual vision,123 for my part at least in the field of work contracts in 
the platform economy. Applying the autonomous concepts of the ECJ 
can sometimes feel like being handed a square peg and being asked to 
choose between two round holes, as famously expressed by District 
Judge Vince Chhabria in the Cotter v Lyft case.124 The judge continued, 
stating that the 20th century tests for classifying workers were not helpful 
in addressing a 21st century problem. Even though derived from a case 
from California, this point might prove valid in the EU as well. Just as 
across the Atlantic, the 20th century tests will have to suffice in the 
absence of legislative action or judicial pronouncement. 
This article does not provide alternative regulatory approaches, nor 
does it intend to suggest that the balance has shifted in favour of anyone 
in particular. This article does however intend to emphasize that the 
current balance of power in work contracts is not alone determined by 
the market, but also an outcome of political decisions. 
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